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ABSTRACT 
The goal of the present paper is to investigate not only the dynamics of 
the Greek public debt, but also what are the appropriate measures 
required for achieving fiscal consolidation. The empirical estimation is 
carried out using a macroeconomic dataset spanning the period 1980-
2008 and both the 3SLS methodological approach on a theoretical model 
and the structural VAR methodology to perform forecast tests and to 
calibrate the future paths of the public debt variable up to 2020. The 
results suggest that only an aggressive growth policy could permit the 
country to achieve debt sustainability. The results are expected to have 
important implications to policy makers for designing effective 
macroeconomic policy in terms of achieving sustainable levels of public 
debt. 
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New Evidence on the Remedies of the Greek 
Sovereign Debt Problem 
1. Introduction 
Moderate levels of public debt can be good helping an economy to 
smooth consumption through the lifetime of individuals and across 
generations, and ease credit constraints faced by firms and individuals 
(Cecchetti et al., 2011). High levels of public debt however, can be 
damaging for an economy1. Private investment could be crowded out 
due to increased interest rate payments; private saving may increase in 
order to accommodate public dissaving leading to lower aggregate 
demand; and higher public debt may come at the cost of higher future 
taxes. High levels of public debt also increase the sensitivity of an 
economy to changes in global market conditions and the likelihood of 
defaulting (Cecchetti et al., 2011).  It additionally places a strain on fiscal 
authorities in implementing countercyclical fiscal policy. Debt 
sustainability can be achieved in a number of ways including, higher 
future taxes (Barro, 1979) and/or curtailing government expenditure, 
both of which are contractionary. These measures however, are 
accompanied by costs. Increasing taxes and cutting down on 
government spending can lead to a loss of welfare undermining growth, 
while reducing the cost of debt through inflation, results in higher 
interest rate payments.  
                                                 
1
 Cecchetti  et al. (2011) investigating the impact of debt levels on economic growth in 18 OECD 
countries from 1980 to 2010, argue that debt levels beyond 85% of GDP is harmful for economic 
growth. 
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The recent financial crisis saw an escalation in public debt levels in 
Greece. The increase in public debt to a height of 171% of GDP in 2011 
(Eurostat 2012) led to concerns regarding Greece’s fiscal sustainability. 
In an attempt to achieve debt sustainability, the government adopted a 
number of austerity measures, including public expenditure cuts and 
higher taxes. The country is currently caught up in a vicious cycle of 
austerity measures making recovery more difficult. Critics argue that 
these measures are counter-productive pushing the country further into 
recession. Achieving fiscal sustainability within the Eurozone is a 
complex task due to a common monetary policy but absence of a 
common fiscal policy among members (Corsetti, 2012). Consequently, a 
common fiscal consolidation package which does not take into account 
country heterogeneity will not have the same outcome for all Eurozone 
members. The focus of policymakers hereto has been on managing 
systemic risk. An important implication stemming from these events is 
that the dynamics of public debt should be analysed on a case by case 
basis. Greece provides for an interesting case in terms of public debt as 
successive Greek governments embarked on programmes of deficit 
financing since 1974 in response to increasing aggregate demand, the 
consequences of which have been felt only now (Makrydakis et al. 
1999). Public debt has varied approximately 100 per cent of GDP since 
1993 (Featherstone 2011). This has been primarily due to the high wage 
expenditures of the public sector due to union resistance and high levels 
of tax evasion, making the country susceptible to crisis events 
(Featherstone 2011). According to the recent quarterly review report for 
the Greek economy published by the Institute of Industrial and Economic 
Research (IOBE, 2013), the fiscal position of the country is on a positive 
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course (i.e., in a sense that the primary fiscal deficit is expected to be on 
the surplus side by the end of 2013), although the continued tight fiscal 
policy implementation will put further recessionary pressure on the 
Greek economy. 
Against this backdrop, the goal of the present paper is to examine the 
dynamics of the Greek public debt and investigate measures required for 
achieving fiscal consolidation. A macroeconomic model based on the 
work of Favero and Marcellino (2005), Hasko (2007), and Casadio et al. 
(2012) is employed for this purpose. The empirical estimation is carried 
out using first the three stage least squares (3SLS) estimation 
methodological approach and, next, for robustness purposes, the 
structural VAR methodology (Blanchard and Watson, 1986; Bernanke, 
1986; Sims, 1986). The advantages of using 3SLS over more conventional 
maximum likelihood (ML) methods include:  
• It does not require any distributional assumptions for independent 
variables, i.e. they can be non-normal, binary, etc.  
• In the context of a multi-equation non-recursive system of equations it 
isolates specification errors to single equations.  
• It is computationally simple and does not require the use of numerical 
optimization algorithms.  
• It easily caters for interactions effects.  
•It permits the routine use of often ignored diagnostic testing 
procedures for problems such as heteroscedasticity and specification 
errors.  
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• It performs better in small samples than ML approaches.  
In terms of the SVAR modeling approach and in addition to robustness 
ends, this methodology can remedy a number of deficiencies related to 
3SLS, such as, it generates less efficient estimates, especially, in large 
samples, while 3SLS estimates depend upon the choice of reference 
variable, implying that different 3SLS estimates are obtained given 
different scaling variables. Therefore, the methodology of the SVAR 
approach offers an attractive approach to estimation. It does not only 
takes explicitly into consideration the theoretical constraints imposed on 
the econometric models, but also it promises to coax interesting 
patterns from the data that will prevail across a set of incompletely 
specified dynamic economic models with a minimum of identifying 
assumptions. Moreover, SVARs are easy to estimate and contribute to 
the understanding of aggregate fluctuations. By having clarified the 
importance of different economic shocks, the have managed to generate 
fruitful debates across different views in the macroeconomic thought. 
We apply these models to perform forecast tests and to calibrate the 
future paths of the primary balance and public debt variables up until 
2020. The results suggest that an aggressive growth policy in terms of 
debt and primary balance to GDP will permit the country to achieve debt 
sustainability. The results of this study will have important implications 
for designing effective macroeconomic policy for achieving sustainable 
levels of debt in Greece. The rest of this paper is structured as follows. 
Section 2 discusses the literature. Section 3 presents the model. Section 
4 describes the data, evaluates the empirical results and presents results 
for forecasts. Section 5 concludes. 
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2. The Literature  
Studies on fiscal adjustment include those by Favero (2002) and 
Marcellino (2006) for the Euro area; by Alesina and Perotti (1995), and 
Giannitsarou and Scott (2006) for the OECD; and by Blanchard and 
Perotti (2002) and Mountford and Uhlig (2002) for the U.S., among 
others. Favero (2002), jointly modelling the behaviour of monetary and 
fiscal authorities in the Euro area, concludes that fiscal stabilization was 
achieved independently of monetary policy. Despite interactions 
between the two authorities, stabilization depends to a great extent on 
the response of fiscal policy to interest rate payments on public debt. 
Similar conclusions are reached by Giannitsarou and Scott (2006) for a 
group of OECD economies. Examining the fiscal balance of governments 
using an inter-temporal budget constraint, they conclude that the 
primary surplus has significant explanatory power for achieving fiscal 
balance. Inflation plays only a very small role for the budget balance. 
Evidence for the fiscal balance in predicting inflation is found to be very 
weak. Investigating the role of monetary and fiscal policy in public debt 
dynamics in a group of OECD nations, Hasko (2007) on the contrary, 
finds that these shocks together account for approximately half the 
forecast error variation in the debt to GDP ratio while about 30% is 
explained by shocks to GDP growth. Shocks to inflation and the debt 
ratio itself play a very small role. However, inflation shocks play an 
important role in initiating a public debt problem. Examining fiscal 
episodes in Denmark, Ireland, Finland and Sweden, Perotti (2011) finds 
that in all four countries the interest rate declined, and wage reductions 
played an important role in fiscal adjustment. 
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Marcellino (2006) examines the influence of non-systematic fiscal policy 
in the four largest countries of the Euro area employing a structural 
vector autoregression (VAR) methodology. Although there is evidence of 
differences across countries and variation in size effects, expenditure 
shocks are not found in general to increase output, while tax shocks 
have a very small effect on output. Expenditure shocks need deficit 
financing, however, tax increases do not appear to require deficit 
financing. Increases in government consumption lead to a fall in output 
in all countries, while social benefits increase output. Examining fiscal 
changes in a group of OECD countries, Alesina and Peroti (1995) and 
Alesina and Ardagna (2009) argue that large fiscal increases are usually 
accompanied by increases in expenditure, while large fiscal adjustments 
are accompanied by tax increases. However, they observe a difference 
between fiscal adjustments that lead to permanent improvements in the 
fiscal balance and those that are temporary.  
Blanchard and Perotti (2002) examine the dynamic effects of shocks in 
government expenditures and taxes on economic activity in the US 
during the postwar period, by using a mixed structural VAR 
methodology. The results indicate that positive government spending 
shocks have a positive effect on output, while positive tax shocks have a 
negative effect on output. Both, increases in taxes and government 
spending, are found to have a negative effect on investment spending. 
Similarly, Mountford and Uhlig (2002) investigate the impacts of fiscal 
policy shocks in the US, employing a VAR methodology. They observe 
that government spending shocks crowd out residential and non-
residential investment, but not consumption. Deficit spending cuts lead 
to economic expansion and unexpected tax increases have a 
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contractionary effect on output. According to them, the most suitable 
fiscal policy for stimulating the economy is a deficit-financed tax cut. 
Examining the role of fiscal policy in severely depressed economies, 
DeLong and Summers (2012) argue that government spending can be 
self-financing under these conditions. That is, an increase in tax 
revenues will finance the increase in debt service given certain 
assumptions hold with regard to government spending multipliers and 
hysteresis effects. 
Using a structural VAR methodology, Giordano et al. (2007) examine the 
influence of fiscal policy on GDP, inflation and the rate of interest in 
Italy. They find that a shock to government expenditure has a positive 
effect on real GDP, employment, consumption and investment. There is 
a positive however very small effect on inflation. Also investigating the 
role of macroeconomic variables including US GDP growth, the price of 
oil, EUR/USD exchange rate, European Central Bank monetary policy 
stance and domestic policy instruments on the Italian debt-to-GDP ratio, 
Casadio et al (2012) argue that external conditions play an important 
role in Italian fiscal consolidation. In contrast to the VAR methodology 
employed by most studies, they employ the seemingly unrelated 
regression (SUR) estimation method.  
Given the inconclusive results with regard to the influence of monetary 
and fiscal authorities on macroeconomic variables, a re-examination of 
this issue is particularly relevant in the context of Greece which was on 
the verge of economic collapse following the financial crisis. Makrydakis 
et al. (1999) note long before the recent financial crisis the non-
sustainability of Greek fiscal policy over the period 1958-1995. Through 
  8 
the Zivot-Andrews sequential integration testing procedure which allows 
for the endogenous determination of regime changes, their results 
suggest the inability of Greek governments to satisfy the properties of an 
intertemporal budget balance in the long-run, leading to a policy regime 
shift in 1979. These views have subsequently been supported by others. 
In particular, Featherstone (2011) provides a number of reasons for the 
Greek crisis issue, highlighting issues of low competitiveness, trade and 
investment imbalances as well as fiscal mismanagement eventually 
resulted in the debt crisis event. Our study deviates from the limited 
literature on public debt issues in Greece in a way that we not only 
estimate, but also carry out forecasting tests for the future path of 
public debt and the primary balance in Greece. 
3.  A Macroeconomic Model 
We follow the approach of Favero and Marcellino (2005), Hasko (2007), 
and Casadio et al. (2012) in specifying a small macroeconomic model for 
Greece. We start off with the evolution of public debt:: 
1 1.t t t t tB B LR B PB           (1) 
where tB   nominal general government debt at the end of year t, 
LR  the long term 
nominal interest rate, PB   the primary balance which is equal to tax 
revenue less government expenditure (T  – G), net of the interest paid 
on debt.2 The budget constraint is usually expressed in terms of the 
                                                 
2
 Note the same relation would hold if the variables are measured in real terms provided that the rate of 
inflation is measured using the GDP deflator (Casadio et al. 2012). 
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growth of public debt to GDP ratio (D), as a function of the difference 
between the real interest rate and output growth rate, and the ratio of 
the primary balance to GDP (BL) (see Hasko, 2007): 
ΔDt = (LRt – πt - ΔYt) Dt-1 - BLt       (2) 
where   inflation rate, Y  real GDP growth. Equation (2), which is 
also a debt dynamics equation, suggests that sustained GDP growth and 
low real interest rates are important for controlling the growth of public 
debt. This equation also shows that the primary balance of the 
government is an important determinant of government public debt.  
 Identity (2) can be used in empirical estimation as a single residual 
equation, by assuming various states for the primary balance, growth, 
inflation, and interest rate, in determining  debt-to-GDP dynamics, or as 
an equation in a VAR framework taking into account the inter-
dependence between  these variables (Casadio et al. 2012). Here, we 
follow the approach of Favero (2002), Favero and Marcellino (2005), 
Hasko (2007), and Casadio et al. (2012) and estimate a simultaneous 
equations models. Our model comprises five equations:  
ΔYt = α1 + α2ΔYt-1 + α3 (LRt-1-πt-1) + α4 BLt-1 + α5 ΔYGt + α6ΔΥUSt + εt
ΔY   (3)  
(Output equation) 
BLt = α7 + α8 BLt-1 + α9 Dt-1 + α10 ΔYt + εt
BL                 (4)  
(Fiscal rule) 
Dt = α11 + α12 t-1 + α13ΔYt + α14 BLt-1 + α15πt-1 + α16 LRt-1 + εt
D                (5) 
(Public debt equation) 
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 πt = α17 + α18 πt-1 + α19 ΔYt-1 + α20 POt + εt
π      (6)  
(Inflation equation) 
 LRt = α21 + α22LRt-1 + α23πt-1 + α24Yt-1 + α25Et-1 + εt
LR     (7) 
 (interest rate equation) 
Equation (3) is an IS curve which also incorporates the international 
business cycle. YUS  captures U.S. output growth (see Favero and 
Marcellino 2005), and ΔYG, German output growth. U.S. output growth 
is incorporated to capture the global economy, while German output 
growth to capture the European growth factor (as Germany is Greece’s 
main trading partner, Dess et al., 2010). As growth in the global 
economy and growth in the German economy would lead to growth in 
Greece, we expect the coefficients, 5 0   and 6 0  . (BL) is the 
primary balance (see Hasko 2007). The coefficient on the primary 
balance, 4 , could be positive in the case of an expansionary fiscal policy 
and negative in the case of a contractionary fiscal policy. The lower the 
real rate of interest, the higher would be the borrowing leading to higher 
growth. Therefore, we would expect  3 0   . 
The primary balance (equation 4) is a function of the past periods 
primary balance to account for delayed effects of fiscal policy (Favero 
and Marcellino, 2005). Following Bohn (1998), growth in output and 
debt to GDP ratio are incorporated as right hand side variables. Bohn 
(1998) finds significant support for the primary surplus to be an 
increasing function of the debt-GDP ratio. The primary balance is a 
positive function of output (α10>0) and the debt-to-GDP-ratio (α9>0). 
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The public debt equation (5) is a function of the past value of the debt to 
GDP ratio, growth, inflation, the primary balance and the interest rate. 
Lagged levels of public debt are included to account for delayed impacts 
of debt on current levels (Favero and Marcellino, 2005). As cyclical 
variations in output influence the debt to GDP ratio we include output 
(Hasko, 2007; Bohn, 1998; Casadio et al., 2012). The inclusion of 
inflation, the primary balance and the interest rate in the debt equation 
is supported by Faini (2006) and Hasko (2007). We expect: α13<0 and 
α14<0. As higher inflation could lead to lower debt servicing costs, we 
expect α15<0. Higher interest rates lead to a higher debt burden 
(Hnatkovska et al., 2008), therefore, α16>0. 
Equation (6), the Phillips curve equation, is a positive function of output, 
α19>0, and the oil price (PO), α20>0 (see, Blanchard and Gali, 2005; 
Casadio et al., 2012).   
Equation (7) is a backward looking Taylor rule (see Hasko, 2007) where 
the interest rate responds to inflation (α23>0) and το output (α24>0). As 
changes in the exchange rate (E) also influence the interest rate, we 
include the exchange rate (see Casadio et al., 2012). E is defined as the 
Euro to US Dollar exchange rate. We expect this coefficient, α25, to be 
positive. 
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4. Empirical Analysis and Results  
4.1 Data 
Quarterly data on real (at constant 2000 prices) GDP (Y), government 
primary balance defined as the difference between total government 
revenues and government spending excluding interest payments (BL), 
gross public debt as a percentage of GDP (D), the long-term nominal 
interest rate, measured as the yield on 10-year government bonds (LR), 
consumer prices, measured as the CPI index (P), world oil prices, 
measured as West Texas Intermediate-WTI crude oil spot prices in 
dollars (PO), the nominal exchange rate between the euro and the dollar 
(E), real GDP for both the U.S. and Germany (YUS and YG), and 
government expenses, measured as percentage of GDP (G). All economic 
data were obtained from the Eurostat database spanning the period 
1980-2008. For the empirical purposes of the study, we also built the 
long-run real interest rate (LRR) as the difference between nominal 
interest rates and inflation, while inflation (π) was measured as 
logarithmic difference of the CPI index. Finally, the RATS software 
(Version 7.0) assisted the empirical analysis. 
4.2 Descriptive Statistics 
To examine the distributional properties of the data used in the 
empirical part of the study, various descriptive statistics are calculated 
and reported in Table 1. These descriptive statistics include mean, 
standard deviation, skewness, kurtosis and Jarque-Bera statistics for 
normality test. The null hypothesis of normality is accepted at the 1% 
level using the Jarque-Bera statistics. Further evidence of the nature of 
acceptance or rejection of normality may be gleaned from the sample 
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skewness and kurtosis measures. The skewness measure is relatively 
small with a negative magnitude, while at the same time kurtosis is not 
large. Since kurtosis refers to excess kurtosis, a value of zero 
corresponds to normality. The low values of kurtosis indicate that the 
normality hypothesis is accepted due to the absence of excess kurtosis. 
TABLE 1. Descriptive Statistics 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
Variable         Mean  Max       Min   Std. Dev.  Skewness   Kurtosis         Jarque-Bera 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
Y            91024.4     233197.7      6106.2   73740.2        0.48     1.89  2.59(0.27) 
B              -650.4         4131.6  -11982.0     3254.7       -0.29              1.34                  4.50(0.14) 
D                            85.9           123.6          23.6         33.7       -0.57              1.83  3.22(0.19) 
LRR                   5.6               9.3            1.7           2.4        0.24              1.11                  2.64(0.15) 
LR                   9.7             17.2            3.6           4.5        0.19              1.61  2.52(0.28) 
P                 50.9             98.9            5.5         31.6       -0.06              1.51                  2.71(0.26) 
E                   0.9               1.3            0.6            0.2       0.18               2.48   4.02(0.13) 
G                 47.0           118.0            4.1          31.5       0.20               1.39                 1.69(0.43) 
YUS             9252.7       13206.4     5834.0       2414.5       0.21               1.75   2.11(0.35) 
YG             3466.2         7239.2     3477.9       1283,1       0.15               1.38                  2.63(0.12) 
PO                  29.7             91.7        11.3           17.0       2.04               2.50                  4.63(0.12) 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
Note: Figures in parentheses denote probability values. 
4.3 Integration Analysis 
We test for unit root non-stationarity by using the tests proposed by 
Dickey and Fuller (1981). In particular, the analysis is based on the 
augmented Dickey-Fuller unit root tests, the results of which are 
presented in Table 2. Using a 5 per cent significance level, those data 
clearly cannot reject the hypothesis of a unit root for all series in levels. 
When first differences were used, unit root non-stationarity was 
rejected. 
However, the power of the statistical unit root test is of critical 
importance. Therefore, two modified Dickey-Fuller tests with good 
power are also applied. They are the DF-WS test, proposed by Park and 
Fuller (1995), which makes use of the WSLS estimator, which is more 
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efficient then the OLS estimator in estimating autoregressive parameters 
and the DF-GLS test, proposed by Elliott et al. (1996), which analyzes the 
sequence of Neyman-Pearson tests of the null hypothesis of the 
presence of a unit root. The results are also reported in Table 1. They 
indicate that all the variables are integrated of order one.  Finally, in 
order to detect any number and the dates of potential structural breaks, 
we recently employed a developed impulse indicator saturation 
technique (Hendry et al., 2008; Johansen and Nielsen, 2009; Hendry and 
Santos, 2010). To analyze the properties of the econometric model, this 
method uses zero-one impulse indicator dummies. Since there are 
potentially T such dummy variables, inclusion all of them in a model is 
not feasible. The impulse indicator dummies, however, can be included 
in a model as separate blocks. In the simplest case with two blocks, the 
sample is split in two equal parts (T/2), then the impulse indicator 
dummies are included only for the first half of the sample, and 
statistically significant dummies at a chosen significant level are stored. 
Further, chosen in the previous step, the impulse indicator dummies are 
dropped and another part of the dummies are included in the model. 
After that, the procedure is repeated for the second part of the sample. 
Statistically significant impulse indicator dummies from two blocks are 
combined and jointly significant ones are retained. A computational 
algorithm, utilized in the OxMetrics software, performs optimal splitting 
and selection of the final model for any number of blocks. 
The results recommend the presence of one structural break (two 
different regimes) in the dynamics of the variables under study. The 
specific date of the structural break has been obtained by impulse 
indicator saturation break test and indicates the 2000Q4-2001Q1 date 
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that occurs due to the participation of the country to the European 
Monetary Union (EMU) and the following changes of monetary policy. 
Since the above break points has a clear-cut economic interpretation, 
the inclusion of the appropriate dummy, taking into account the impact 
of such a break in a unit root test, is not just a “fitting” of the regression; 
it is based on a solid economic ground. It is also important, that the 
break point is chosen endogenously within the impulse indicator 
saturation break test. 
The step dummy is then included in the univariate Dickey-Fuller unit root 
test and it considered as an additional variable when determining the 
appropriate critical values and critical values are determined on the 
basis of Ericsson and MacKinnon (2002). The results are also reported in 
Table 2 and provide further support to the presence of a unit root in the 
levels of the variables under study and to the absence of a unit root in 
their first differences. 
TABLE 2. Unit Root Tests 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
ADF Tests 
                              Levels                                                First differences 
                Without trend With trend                        Without trend With trend 
Y         -1.25(3)         -1.65(2)                              -6.10(2)*        -6.43(1)* 
BL        -1.42(3)      -1.72(3)   -4.93(2)*        -5.62(2)* 
D                -1.39(3)          -1.83(3)   -4.91(1)*        -5.58(1)*  
LRR        -1.48(3)      -1.97(3)   -5.71(2)*        -6.48(2)* 
LR        -1.39(3)      -1.86(3)   -4.94(2)*        -5.62(2)* 
P        -1.32(3)      -1.69(3)   -5.41(1)*        -5.81(1)* 
E        -1.06(3)         -1.49(2)   -7.11(1)*        -7.38(1)* 
G        -1.28(3)      -1.65(3)   -5.63(2)*        -6.11(2)* 
YUS        -1.41(3)      -1.52(3)   -4.85(1)*        -5.23(2)* 
YG        -1.38(3)         -1.62(3)   -4.75(2)*        -5.16(1)* 
PO        -1.57(3)      -1.82(3)   -5.13(2)*        -5.46(2)* 
 
DF-WS Test 
          Levels-trend     First differences-trend 
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Y     -2.19(2)                                         -4.66(1)* 
BL    -0.40(3)              -4.28(2)* 
D            -0.92(3)             -4.24(1)*  
LRR    -2.72(3)              -4.13(2)* 
LR    -1.85(3)      -4.37(1)* 
P    -1.69(3)              -4.62(1)* 
E    -2.51(2)              -4.61(1)* 
G    -2.54(3)              -4.87(2)* 
YUS    -2.65(3)              -4.79(2)* 
YG    -2.11(3)              -4.88(1)* 
PO    -2.67(3)             -6.86(2)* 
 
DF-GLS 
     Levels          First differences 
Y     -2.27(3)                                         -4.72(2)* 
BL    -0.84(2)              -4.58(2)* 
D            -1.13(3)             -4.38(2)*  
LRR    -2.14(3)              -4.58(2)* 
LR    -2.06(4)              -4.72(2)* 
P    -1.52(3)              -4.77(2)* 
E    -2.27(2)      -4.39(1)* 
G    -2.19(3)              -4.81(2)* 
YUS    -2.53(3)              -4.61(1)* 
YG    -2.17(2)              -4.95(1)* 
PO    -2.39(3)             -5.94(1)* 
 
 
ADF Test with Break 
          Levels-trend     First differences-trend 
Y     -2.45(3)                                         -4.85(2)* 
BL    -0.86(3)              -4.73(2)* 
D            -1.24(3)             -4.62(1)*  
LRR    -2.51(3)              -4.59(1)* 
LR    -1.91(3)      -4.66(1)* 
P    -1.48(2)              -4.94(1)* 
E    -2.14(3)              -4.84(1)* 
G    -2.17(3)              -5.38(2)* 
YUS    -2.44(2)              -4.95(1)* 
YG    -1.91(3)              -5.09(2)* 
PO    -2.10(2)             -7.43(1)* 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
Notes:  
Numbers in square brackets denote the optimal number of lags used in the augmentation of 
the test regression and were obtained through the Akaike criterion.  
* indicates that the unit root null hypothesis is rejected at the 5 per cent level. 
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4.4 Estimating the Model (3)-(7)-A Simultaneous System of Equations  
In the first step of the empirical analysis, the system of equations (3) to 
(7) is estimated as a system of equation using three stages least squares 
(3SLS), which deals with the potential endogeneity problem, while, 
based on our unit root tests, all variables are in first differences, while 
the dummy variable (DEMU) has been included to capture the country’s 
participation in the EMU. Table 3 reports the results of the estimation of 
the system of equation (3)-(7). The empirical findings point out that all 
coefficients have the expected theoretical sign as it was explained above 
in terms of the theoretical model, while they are statistically significant. 
To check the statistical validity of the model we also performed a couple 
of diagnostic tests. In particular, LM and RESET are tests for serial 
correlation and model functional misspecification, respectively, while 
figures in brackets denote p-values. 
 By focusing on the two equations of interest, equations (4) and 
(5), the results in equation (4) show that the primary balance shows high 
inertia, e.g. 0.764, confirming the presence of delayed effects in terms of 
fiscal policy. In addition, an increase of 1% of the debt-GDP ratio, output 
growth and changes in the long-term interest rate leads to a 0.33%, 
0.60% and 0.84%, respectively, increase in the primary balance. In terms 
of equation (5), a 1% increase in the primary balance, in the growth rate 
and in inflation leads to a 0.07%, 0.21% and 0.07%, respectively, decline 
in the public debt to GDP ratio. By contrast, a 1% increase in the change 
of the long-term interest rate leads to a 0.71% increase in the public 
debt to GDP ratio. Finally, the public debt to GDP ratio also displays high 
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inertia, e.g. 0.708, confirming that higher long term interest rates tend 
to worsen the debt burden of the country. 
TABLE 3. Estimations of Equations (3)-(7) 
Variables     Equation (3)   Equation (4)    Equation (5)    Equation (6)    Equation (7) 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
Constant  2.107  0.428  -1.714  2.316  0.432 
  (0.38)  (0.47)  (-1.24)*** (3.68)* (0.72) 
ΔΥ(-1)   0.718      0.528  0.138 
  (5.62)*     (5.64)* (5.94)* 
ΔLRR(-1)  0.072 
  (4.88)* 
ΔBL(-1) -0.614  0.781  -0.189 
  (-6.36)* (4.83)* (-5.38)* 
ΔYUS   0.237 
  (5.11)* 
ΔYG       0.369 
  (6.74)* 
ΔD (-1)     0.348  0.761 
     (7.24)* (5.71)* 
ΔΥ      0.637            -0.265 
     (6.31)* (-5.61)* 
π(-1)      -0.078  0.839  0.195 
      (-4.84)* (7.37)* (6.39)* 
ΔLR(-1)      0.793    0.761 
      (6.35)*   (4.53)* 
ΔPO        0.562 
        (6.39)* 
ΔE(-1)          0.0512 
          (6.11)* 
DMU               0.218  0.085  0.258  -0.318  -0.227 
  (4.57)*   (5.13)* (4.94)* (-5.38)* (-5.26)* 
 
Diagnostics 
R
2
-adjusted  0.71  0.62  0.72  0.68  0.70 
LM    [0.26]  [0.31]  [0.35]  [0.33]  [0.43]  
RESET   [0.25]  [0.56]   [0.39]  [0.24]  [0.28] 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
Notes:  
Figures in parentheses denote t-statistics, while probability values are in brackets. LM is a 
serial correlation test and RESET is a functional misspecification test. The following 
instruments were used: for equation (3)=lagged values for ΔLLR, ΔBAL, ΔYUS, ΔYGER and lags 
3 and 4 for ΔY, for equation (4) = lagged values of ΔBAL and ΔDEBT, 3 lags for ΔY, for 
equation (5) = 2 lags for ΔBAL, ΔDEBT and ΔLR, 3 lags for ΔY and π, for equation (6) = 2lags 
for ΔY and 2 lags for π and ΔPOIL, and for equation (7) = 2 lags for ΔY and π, 3 lags for ΔLR 
and ΔE. 
*, *** indicates statistical significance at 1% and 10%, respectively. 
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4.5 Estimating the Model (3) Through (7) - A Structural Vector 
Autoregressive (VAR) Model 
Alternatively to the methodology of a simultaneous system of equations, 
the model (3) through (7) is estimated using the methodological 
approach of the structural VAR model. This particular approach assumes 
that the structure of our model is described by a structural form 
equation, ignoring constant terms. There are several ways of specifying 
the restrictions to achieve identification of the structural parameters. A 
general method for imposing restrictions was suggested by Blanchard 
and Watson (1986), Bernanke (1986) and Sims (1986) that gives 
restrictions on only contemporaneous (long-run) structural parameters. 
This method permits non-recursive structures and the specification of 
restrictions based on prior theoretical and empirical information about 
public sector behavior and policy reaction functions, such as equation (7) 
in our model specification. These structural restrictions are summarized 
in Table 4. The ‘exogeneity restrictions’ block indicates that the variables 
included in this are determined exogenously and affected only by their 
own exogenous shocks. The restricted model is estimated with the 
assistance of the Bernanke (1986) restriction matrix which associates the 
residuals from the underlying un-restricted VAR model with the 
structural shocks. For the description about this matrix, see the 
Appendix. 
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TABLE 4. Structural Restrictions 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
Block of exogeneity restrictions 
u
ΔPO
 = v
ΔPO 
u
ΔE
 = v
ΔE
 
u
ΔLRR
 = v
ΔLRR 
u
ΔYUS
 = v
ΔYUS 
u
ΔYG
 = v
ΔYG 
Block of structural restrictions 
u
ΔLR
 = f1 u
π
 + f2 u
ΔY
 + f3 u
ΔE
 + v
ΔLR 
u
π
 = d1 u
ΔY
 + d2 u
ΔPO
 + v
Δπ
 
u
ΔD
 = c1 u
ΔY
 + c2 u
ΔBL
 + c3 u
π
 + c4 u
ΔLR
 + v
ΔD
 
u
ΔBL
 = b1 u
ΔD
 + b2 u
ΔY
 + v
ΔBL
 
u
ΔY
 = a1 u
ΔLRR
 + a2 u
ΔBL
 + a3 u
ΔYUS
 + a4 u
ΔYG
 + v
ΔY
 
 
Notes: u denotes residuals from the unrestricted VAR model, while v denotes structural 
shocks. 
The estimated coefficients of the structural identification, i.e. the 
structural equation that belong in the block of structural restrictions of 
Table, 4 are summarized as follows: 
uΔLR = 0.249 uπ + 0.121 uΔY + 0.0465 uΔE  
uπ = 0.484 uΔY + 0.543 uΔPO  
uΔD = -0.272 uΔY – 0.224 uΔBL – 0.057 uπ + 0.712 uΔLR  
uΔBL = 0.329 uΔD + 0.648 uΔY  
uΔY = 0.079 uΔLRR – 0.662 uΔBL + 0.248 uΔYUS + 0.402 uΔYG  
Once again, the coefficients carry the expected theoretical sign as before 
in the case of the simultaneous system of equations. 
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4.6  Forecasting Comparisons of the Fiscal Equations Across the Two 
Models 
In this part of the study we perform forecasting tests to check the 
forecasting capacity of the two alternative models. In particular, we 
perform an out-of-sample forecasting exercise, using a rolling regression 
methodology. That is, the model is first estimated using data up until the 
first forecasting period. The forecasts are generated at one, two, three 
and four quarters. In the next step, the estimation period is rolled 
forward by one quarter, keeping the total length of the estimation 
period fixed. New forecasts are then generated at one, two, three and 
four quarters. In the end, the squares of the forecast errors at the 
different horizons are averaged using the root mean square error 
(RMSE), the mean absolute error (MAE) and the Theil Inequality 
Coefficient (THEIL). 
More specifically, the estimation period goes from 1980:1 to 2000:4, 
while the forecast period goes from 2001:1 to 2008:4. The reason we 
selected this particular break point is because on January 1st, 2001 the 
country joined the eurozone as a full member. We, thus, compare the 
out-of-sample forecasted values with the actual values. In order to 
assess the forecasting performance we have to analyze the forecast 
accuracy through a set of statistical measures, while the forecasting 
exercise will take place in terms of equations (4) and (5), i.e. primary 
balance and public debt. The empirical findings, reported in Table 4, 
show that the forecasting performance in both equations deteriorates, 
as we extend the forecasting horizon from 1 to 4 quarters ahead. The 
evidence using all three alternative metrics is reported in Table 4 and 
suggests that the structural VAR (SVAR) model performs better than the 
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estimations through the 3SLS model at forecasting both fiscal variables 
and at all horizons.  
TABLE 5. Forecasting Metrics 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
       RMSE       MAE      THEIL 
  3SLS  SVAR  3SLS SVAR  3SLS SVAR 
_______________________________________________________________ 
Equation (4) 
     1  12.762   8.914  9.784 7.963  0.616 0.438 
     2  12.984 10.438  9.918 8.784  0.683 0.426 
     3  13.549 10.953           10.569 8.928  0.748 0.492 
     4  13.806 11.327           11.173 9.458  0.791 0.540 
Equation (5)     
      1    7.994   5.144  6.325 4.648  0.219 0.188 
      2    8.528   5.638  6.874 4.872  0.263 0.206 
      3    8.894   5.917  7.329 5.429  0.297 0.251 
      4    9.246   6.213  7.772 5.842  0.327 0.287 
 
4.7 A Calibration Exercise With the SVAR Model 
Based on the forecasting superiority of the SVAR model, in this sub-
section we are making use of it calibrate the future path (e.g. up to 
2020) of the relevant public debt fiscal variable, under the 
implementation of an austerity program imposed by the ‘Troika’ [the 
International Monetary Fund-IMF, the European Central Bank-ECB, and 
the European Commission-EC] which the country strictly follows. To this 
end, we have to make the following assumptions: 
- The oil price on December 1st, 2012 is $88.94 and it is assumed to 
remain constant across the calibration exercise. 
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- The euro-US dollar exchange rate on December 1st, 2012 is 
1.29862 and it is also assumed to remain constant across the 
calibration exercise. 
- For the future course of output growth we are following three 
alternative scenarios: a downside (poor) scenario with output 
growth=-4% across the calibration exercise, a mediocre scenario 
with output growth=1% across the calibration exercise, and, 
finally, an upside (good) scenario with output growth=4% across 
the calibration exercise. 
The results for these fiscal projections are shown in Figure 1. The 
findings indicate that the debt-to-GDP ratio in the downside scenario 
reaches its maximum value of 249,6% in 2020. In the moderate scenario 
its value turns out to be 201.3% in 2020 and, finally, in the upside 
scenario its value turns out to be 166.6% in 2020. Therefore, if the 
country follows an aggressive growth policy, its debt (as % of GDP) is 
expected to significantly decline and reach reasonable levels that will 
allow the country to experience sustainable fiscal measures. 
 
Figure 1. Projections for Public Debt (% GDP) 
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5. Conclusions 
This paper investigated the dynamics of the Greek public debt, while it 
also indicated what are the appropriate measures required for achieving 
fiscal consolidation. The empirical estimation was carried out using a 
macroeconomic dataset spanning the period 1980-2008 as well as two 
econometric methodological approaches, i.e. the three stage least 
squares technique on a theoretical model and the structural VAR 
methodology, to perform forecast tests. The estimations were used to 
calibrate-simulate the evolution of the primary fiscal variables, i.e. the 
primary balance and public debt, until 2020. The empirical findings 
pointed to the fact that only an aggressive growth policy could permit 
the country to achieve debt sustainability.  
The results carry a number of implications. In particular, debt 
sustainability can be achieved by increasing taxes and cutting down on a 
number of government expenditure. Higher taxes and cuts to 
government expenditure, however, are expected to have adverse 
consequences on the economy, and, mainly, to slow down growth. 
Inflation can reduce the real cost of debt servicing; however, is 
associated with higher interest rates which are also expected to increase 
debt servicing, and, thus, further aggravating the growth picture of the 
country. With proposals underway for Basel III, we welcome a greater 
emphasis on the quality of capital held by banks, increased capital 
adequacy requirements, increased liquidity standards, a coordinated 
leverage ratio controlling for risk, greater counter-cyclical capital 
controls, and a greater international coordination, especially on an 
European level. Regulations including a tighter enforcement and 
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transparency with respect to the channeling of public debt would 
substantially increase government accountability. 
In conclusion, the research implications are highly substantial for 
designing effective macroeconomic policy in terms of achieving 
sustainable levels of public debt in Greece, given the country’s position 
in the centre of the recent European sovereign debt crisis as well as the 
three austerity-rescue plans imposed by the International Monetary 
Fund, the European Central Bank and the European Commission (the 
‘Troika’). 
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Appendix 
In terms of the Bernanke (1986) restrictions pattern and given the order: 
ΔPOIL, ΔE, ΔLRR, ΔYUS, ΔYGER, π, ΔDEBT, ΔBAL, ΔY, and ΔLR, the 
restriction matrix looks like: 
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 
1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 
0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 
0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 
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